|
Last weekend, a conference held under the
title "Gaza the victory" took place at hotel near Istanbul's
Ataturk airport. The conference brought 200 Sunni clerics
and activists together with senior, Damascus-based Hamas
officials.
Closed meetings held after the main
conference sessions focused on the creation of a "third
jihadist front" against Israel - the first two being Iraq
and Afghanistan, in the view of the conference delegates.
The gathering was addressed by Muhammad Nazzal, a top Hamas
official from Damascus.
In an echo of the attempts by Islamists
across the Middle East to pressure Egypt during the recent
Gaza operation, Nazzal called on regional governments to
"open the borders and let the fighters through."
The gathering in Istanbul is significant
for two reasons. First, it showcases the continued efforts
by Islamist movements to present the Gaza events as a
watershed dividing the path of "resistance," which they
favor, from the path of "collaboration" that they accuse
leading Arab states of following.
Second, and perhaps more important, the
location of the conference is a further indication of the
move of the Islamist AKP government in Turkey toward a more
and more open alignment with anti-Western and anti-Israeli
forces in the region.
The conference organizers themselves were
aware of the significance of the event's location. One of
them told a BBC journalist attending the event, "During the
past 100 years relations [between Arabs and Turks] have been
strained, but Palestine has brought us together."
Speakers at the conference made constant
reference to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
decision to storm off the stage in protest during a recent
debate in Davos, Switzerland, on the Gaza operation.
The current Turkish government's
willingness to engage with and host regional and Palestinian
Islamist forces is not new. Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal made
a controversial trip to Ankara less than a month after
Hamas's victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections
in January 2006. Interestingly, Mashaal was asked to come
directly by the AKP government, after the more
secular-minded Turkish Foreign Ministry refused to extend an
invitation to him.
At the time, some analysts sought to
present the invitation to Mashaal as a one-off gesture
without deeper significance for the Israeli-Turkish
relationship. Subsequent events have disproved this
interpretation.
Turkey's response to the Gaza offensive
has highlighted a deep rift in relations. Erdogan in the
course of the operation questioned Israel's UN membership.
The atmosphere in Turkey during Operation Cast Lead became
deeply charged against Israelis and Jews - with a number of
ugly incidents recorded across the country. Erdogan attended
the emergency summit in Doha on January 16 that was convened
by Syria and Qatar to offer support to Hamas.
Turkey's courting of Hamas and hosting of
Islamist gatherings form part of a more general regional
policy pursued by the AKP government in Ankara. The AKP
seeks to build Turkey's regional "strategic depth" - in its
preferred phrase - by building up relations with Syria and
Iran. This is presented as a desire to counter-balance,
rather than replace, Ankara's already deep links with the
West.
However, in the current situation of sharp
polarization and cold war in the region, it is becoming
increasingly unfeasible for countries to maintain close
relations with both the US-led and the Iranian-led camps.
The prospect of Turkey moving toward the Iranian-led
alliance can no longer be dismissed as fanciful.
Turkish analysts have noted the rise of a
"Muslim nationalist" orientation in the country, of which
the political dominance of the AKP over the last half decade
forms the political expression.
From this perspective, a regional policy
which stresses alliances with other Muslim governments and
movements across the region is a natural choice. Growing
warmth in Turkey's relations with Iran and Syria, and the
sympathy shown their key client organization Hamas last
weekend in Istanbul are all elements of this emerging
policy.
Of course, it is much too soon to write
off the relationship between Turkey and Israel. There are
powerful forces within the country which oppose the AKP's
"strategic depth" orientation. Nevertheless, Turkey's
position on recent events has brought great cheer to the
Iranian-led camp, and is leading to corresponding new
efforts at courtship from Teheran.
Senior Iranian officials praised Turkey's
stance during the Gaza crisis, and called for a strategic
alliance between the two countries. Yahya Safavi, former
commander of the Revolutionary Guards and now security
adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said earlier this
month that "Erdogan's... courageous words at the Davos
summit against the war crimes of the Zionist regime... are
evidence of the Islamic awakening among the Turkish people -
a result of the influence of Iran's Islamic Revolution."
Majlis speaker and former nuclear
negotiator Ali Larijani visited Turkey during the Gaza
crisis, holding closed talks with Erdogan. Following the
meetings, both men called to enhance the already extensive
economic links between Iran and Turkey.
Where is Turkey heading?
What can be said with certainty is that
Ankara's long-maintained policy of equidistance between
Israelis and Palestinians has been dispensed with by the
current leadership. The AKP government is aligning itself
not only with the Palestinians, but with Hamas. In the
longer term, this may portend a slow shift toward greater
alignment with the Iranian-led regional alliance. Such a
shift, if it occurs, will be of primary significance to the
strategic balance in the region.
(Translations of comments by Iranian
officials by Memri.)
Jonathan Spyer is a senior researcher
at the Global Research in International Affairs Center, IDC,
Herzliya.
|
